A Conceptual Argument Against Existential Inertia

Suppose we affirm perfect being theism, that is, the conception of God defended by medievals such as Augustine and Aquinas, and made famous by Anselm, as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” On this view, from the principle that God must be the greatest possible being, we can throw some light into the divine attributes by employing the logical structure: for some property X, it would be greater for God to have X than not-X; God is the greatest possible being; So God has X.

Now consider the following argument:

1. God is “that than which nothing greater can be conceived.”
2. Either God’s control over the persistence of things is mediated by some intermediary (existential inertia) or it isn’t.
3. If God’s control over the persistence of things were mediated by some intermediary, one could, per impossibile, conceive of God ceasing to exist, yet some substance X persisting in existence.
4. But having immediate control over the persistence of things is a greater perfection than having mediated control over them.
5. So, God has immediate control over the persistence of things.
6. So, existential inertia is false.

Premise 2 is not essential to the argument, as it simply outlines the disjunctive possibilities. Premise 3 could perhaps be reworked as a sub-argument for 4: having mediated control over the persistence of things counts as a lesser perfection , inasmuch as it leads to this counterpossible scenario of God conceivably ceasing to exist, yet things persisting in existence without him.[¹] Having immediate control over the persistence of things does not lead to such a scenario, and so it counts as a greater perfection. Premise 4 can also be motivated from the perspective of divine sovereignty, since God having unrestricted, immediate control over X safeguards the strongest possible notion of divine sovereignty.

We can thus reformulate the argument as follows:

1. God is “that than which nothing greater can be conceived.”
2. But having immediate control over the persistence of things is a greater perfection than having mediated control over them.
   — 2a. If God’s control over the persistence of things were mediated by some intermediary, one could, per impossibile, conceive of God ceasing to exist, yet some substance X persisting in existence.
   — 2b. However, if God has immediate control over the persistence of things, such counterpossible scenario does not obtain.
3. So, God has immediate control over the persistence of things.
4. So, existential inertia is false.

An objection to this argument would have to offer an account of why it would be better, or more fitting, for God to create a world in which things persist in existence by virtue of some intermediary. Compare, for example, Aquinas’ account of why it was more fitting for God to create through secondary causes rather than creating all things in a flash, as this better upholds the dignity of created things and makes them co-creators.[²] What such an account looks like in the case of the persistence of things, however, is anyone’s guess, as it is difficult to see what sort of dignity substances gain in persisting by virtue of some metaphysical principle as opposed to being upheld immediately by God’s power.

[¹]: Put another way, if God is responsible for the creation of all things, and yet all things persist in existence, not by virtue of God’s immediate causality, but by virtue of some sort of physical/metaphysical impetus, then we could conceive of a counterpossible scenario where God ceases to exist, and things do not fall out of existence right away. This is because, in such a scenario, the continuing of things in existence is not immediately owed to God but rather to some physical/metaphysical impetus. The picture we are left with is is that of a creation existing and persisting in existence wholly apart from God, if only for a brief moment, which seems absurd.

[²]: ST I, q. 22, a. 3